LCS Program Cost and Opportunity Cost
9th August 2024
Value – The LCS has almost no combat capability. Hence, the value for the money is near zero.
Opportunity Cost – The opportunity cost = $27.5B. What could we have done with $27.5B if we had not spent it on the LCS program? Well, the alternative opportunities are nearly endless: munitions, mines, a dedicated minesweeper, ASW destroyer/corvette, air wings, dry docks, etc. At this point, it’s not even debatable that almost any alternative choice would have been a better use of the funds. In other words, the opportunity cost-value far exceeded the actual cost-value.
Bear in mind that this is not a case of hindsight. Almost everyone except the Navy pointed out massive problems with the program from day one: concurrency, lack of CONOPS, a multitude of design issues, insufficient weight and stability margins, a badly flawed manning model, a badly flawed maintenance model, lack of armament, complete absence of modules, etc. There was no hindsight involved or required. The problems were painfully obvious and predictable. In fact, the term ‘predictable’ implies a small degree of uncertainty. Regarding the LCS problems, there was no uncertainty. The problems were 100% certain to occur, as was pointed out by … well … everyone.
The LCS is the poster child for a program that should never have left the back-of-the-napkin stage. It produced no value and a staggering $27.5B wasted opportunity cost.